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Real Rigidity, Nominal Rigidity,  
and the Social Value of Information†
By George-Marios Angeletos, Luigi Iovino, and Jennifer La’O*
Does welfare improve when firms are better informed about the 
state of the economy and can thus better coordinate their production 
and pricing decisions? We address this question in an elementary 
business-cycle model that highlights how the dispersion of 
information can impede both kinds of decisions and, in this sense, be 
the source of both real and nominal rigidity. Within this context we 
develop a taxonomy for how the social value of information depends 
on the two rigidities, on the sources of the business cycle, and on the 
conduct of monetary policy. (JEL D21, D82, D83, E32, E52)
Economic agents have access to various sources of information about the state 
of the economy, some of which are private (such as the signals each firm extracts 
from its own market interactions) and some of which are public (such as macroeco-
nomic statistics and central bank communications). By informing each agent about 
the activity of others, public information can ease coordination, whereas private 
information can hinder it. In this paper, we study the welfare consequences of this 
mechanism within the context of a micro-founded business-cycle model in which 
firms make their employment, production, and pricing choices under incomplete 
information about one another’s choices and about the state of the economy.
Background.—We are not the first to study how information affects coordination 
and welfare. In an influential article, Morris and Shin (2002) used a “beauty contest” 
game—a linear-quadratic game in which actions are strategic complements—to for-
malize the coordinating role of public information and to study its welfare implica-
tions. In such a game, public signals have a disproportionate effect on equilibrium 
outcomes relative to what is warranted on the basis of their informational content 
regarding fundamentals alone. This is due to the fact that the players use such sig-
nals not only to predict fundamentals but also to coordinate their actions. In this 
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regard, public signals can play a role akin to that of sunspots, possibly contributing 
to higher volatility and lower welfare.
Because strategic complementarity emerges naturally from the aggregate demand 
externalities that are embedded in macroeconomic models, Morris and Shin’s analy-
sis was used to inform the debate on the pros and cons of central bank transparency.1 
However, subsequent work raised questions about the validity of applying Morris 
and Shin’s lessons to a macroeconomic context.
Using a richer game-theoretic framework, Angeletos and Pavan (2007) high-
lighted that Morris and Shin’s welfare conclusion hinges on the assumption that 
coordination is socially harmful—an assumption that need not be valid in workhorse 
macroeconomic models. Reinforcing this observation, a line of applied work that 
includes Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010); Hellwig (2005); Lorenzoni (2010); Roca 
(2005); and Walsh (2007) found different welfare effects than those suggested by 
Morris and Shin in variants of the New-Keynesian model in which nominal rigidity 
originates from incomplete information rather than Calvo-like sticky prices.
This applied work, some of which we revisit in Section VI, has pushed the anal-
ysis of the question of interest from abstract games to workhorse macroeconomic 
models. This is a crucial step, as “anything goes” without the discipline of specific 
micro-foundations: different assumptions about the payoff structure of a game can 
justify any sort of welfare effect.
Yet, this work faces certain limitations. By equating the informational friction 
to a particular form of nominal rigidity, it abstracts from the bite that the former 
can have on productive efficiency regardless of nominal rigidity. Formally, it lets 
the informational friction impose a measurability constraint on nominal prices, but 
abstracts from any such constraint on real quantities. It is thus as if employment and 
production choices, in contrast to pricing choices, are made under complete infor-
mation. Furthermore, this work intertwines the welfare effects of information with 
those of particular monetary policies, often confounding the informational incom-
pleteness of the firms with frictions in the conduct of monetary policy—a point that 
we formalize and clarify in due course.
Our Contribution.—Seeking to overcome these limitations, in this paper we con-
sider a framework in which firms make not only their pricing choices but also cer-
tain employment and production choices on the basis of dispersed noisy information 
about the underlying aggregate shocks. In this sense, we allow the incompleteness 
of information to be the source of both real and nominal rigidity, that is, to impose 
a measurability constraint on both quantities and prices.2
In addition, we dissect how the welfare effects of information depend on whether 
monetary policy coincides with or deviates from two important policy benchmarks. 
The first corresponds to a policy that replicates flexible prices, in the sense of imple-
menting the same allocation as the one that would have obtained in the absence 
1 See, e.g., the follow-up articles in this journal by Svensson (2006); Morris, Shin, and Tong (2006); and James 
and Lawler (2011). 
2 Our notion of real rigidity differs from the one typically used in the New-Keynesian literature. In that litera-
ture, the term refers to the lack of response in a firm’s desired relative price to aggregate disturbances due to tech-
nology, preferences, or market power. In our paper, the term instead refers to the lack of response in a firm’s real 
quantity to aggregate disturbances due to incomplete information. 
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of the nominal rigidity. The second identifies the unconstrained optimal monetary 
policy, meaning the solution to the Ramsey problem in which the planner can set 
the nominal interest rate as an arbitrary function of the underlying state of nature.
This approach permits us to develop a certain taxonomy for how the answer to 
the question of interest depends on the conduct of monetary policy, on the nature of 
the underlying business-cycle disturbances, and on the aforementioned two types of 
rigidity.3 In so doing, we also qualify some of the lessons that have appeared in the 
literature.
Isolating the Real Rigidity.—In the first part of the paper (Sections I–III), we 
study the case polar opposite to the one considered in prior work: we assume that 
firms choose employment on the basis of incomplete information, thus accommodat-
ing real rigidity, but we let prices adjust freely to the realized state. We thus abstract 
from nominal rigidity and thereby shut down the pivotal role that monetary policy 
plays once nominal rigidity is present. This part serves as a stepping stone toward 
the second part of the paper, which ultimately allows for both types of rigidity.
We first study how information affects two familiar welfare components: the vol-
atility of the aggregate output gap and the inefficient cross-sectional dispersion in 
relative prices (and quantities). For each component separately, we show how the 
sign of these effects is governed by three sets of factors: (i) preference and technol-
ogy parameters that pin down the coordination motives; (ii) whether the information 
is private or public; and (iii) the underlying business-cycle shocks.
We next show that, despite non-monotone and often conflicting effects on these 
two components, the sign of the overall welfare effect of either type of information 
is governed solely by the sources of the business cycle. When the business cycle is 
driven by non-distortionary forces such as technology shocks, welfare unambigu-
ously increases with either private or public information. When instead the business 
cycle is driven by distortionary forces such as shocks to monopoly markups, welfare 
unambiguously decreases with either type of information.4
To some extent, this result is a priori intuitive: in the case of technology shocks, 
one may expect information to be welfare-improving because the firms’ reaction to 
such shocks is socially desirable, while the converse is true in the case of markup 
shocks. However, this basic intuition can fall apart when information is dispersed: 
in Morris and Shin (2002), the equilibrium is first-best efficient when information is 
commonly shared, resembling what happens in our setting in the absence of monop-
oly distortions, yet welfare can decrease with the precision of public information 
when, and only when, information is dispersed. As we explain in due course, the 
sharpness of our results therefore hinges to the following property of our micro-
founded setting: the private value that the firms assign to the coordination of their 
3 In this paper, we focus on the distinct normative implications of the two types of rigidity. However, the two also 
have distinct positive implications. For example, when the rigidity is nominal, the response of macroeconomic out-
comes to the underlying noise shock can take any sign, depending on the conduct of monetary policy. Furthermore, 
there is a Philips curve: any deviation of the level of real output from the complete-information point is necessarily 
associated with a commensurate movement in the price level. None of this is true when the rigidity is real. 
4 In the latter case, a countervailing effect is also at work unless one assumes, as is often done in the literature, 
that a noncontingent subsidy is used to eliminate the mean (or “steady-state”) distortion in economic activity. We 
characterize this effect in Proposition 4 but, in line with the literature, abstract from it in the rest of our analysis. 
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choices coincides with the corresponding social value. In the absence of such a coin-
cidence, the welfare effects of either type of information could have been reverted.
Adding Nominal Rigidity.—In the second part of the paper (Section IV), we 
study a more general framework, in which we let the informational friction impede 
not only the firms’ employment and production choices but also their price-setting 
behavior. As noted before, we anchor our analysis to two benchmarks that help dis-
sect the role of monetary policy. The first identifies policies that replicate flexible 
prices; the second identifies the unconstrained Ramsey optimum. As in the baseline 
New-Keynesian model, these two benchmarks coincide in the case of technology 
shocks, but not in the case of markup shocks. Importantly, the scenarios studied in 
the related prior work assume not only the absence of real rigidity but also specific 
deviations from these benchmarks.
Consider the first benchmark. When monetary policy replicates flexible prices, 
the question of interest admits the same answer as in our baseline model: welfare 
increases (respectively, decreases) with either type of information when the business 
cycle is driven by technology shocks (respectively, markup shocks). Furthermore, 
information matters at this benchmark only because of the real rigidity: in the 
absence of real rigidity, the flexible-price policy implements the complete-informa-
tion outcome, irrespective of how noisy the firms’ information might be.
Away from this benchmark, an additional effect emerges: information affects not 
only the bite of the real rigidity but also the firms’ ability to forecast, and thus pre-
empt, any action of the monetary authority that attempts to move the economy away 
from its flexible-price outcomes. The welfare contribution of this additional effect 
then depends on whether such deviations are socially desirable or not—a question 
that is directly answered by our policy benchmarks.
When the business cycle is driven by technology shocks, any deviation from flex-
ible prices is welfare-deteriorating. Increasing the information that is available to 
firms may then improve welfare not only by alleviating the real rigidity but also 
by helping the firms forecast, and undo, the “mistakes” in monetary policy. In this 
sense, transparency is good.
When, instead, the business cycle is driven by markup shocks or other distor-
tions, an appropriate deviation from flexible prices is desirable, for reasons once 
again familiar from the New-Keynesian framework: the optimal policy exploits the 
nominal rigidity in order to substitute for a missing tax instrument, namely, the 
 state-contingent subsidy that would have offset the markup shock. More informa-
tion in the hands of the private sector can then be detrimental for welfare, not only 
for the reasons highlighted in our baseline model, but also by reducing the effective-
ness of monetary policy. In this sense, opacity becomes preferable.
To recap, the taxonomy we develop provides sharp answers to our question under 
two familiar policy benchmarks, but it also builds a roadmap for understanding the 
welfare effects of information away from them. As an application of this roadmap, 
in Section V we revisit the prior contributions of Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010); 
Hellwig (2005); Lorenzoni (2010); and Walsh (2007), shedding further light on the 
key mechanisms in these papers, qualifying some of the policy lessons, and facili-
tating a certain synthesis.
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Layout.—Sections I–III study the baseline model. Section IV analyzes the role of 
monetary policy. Section V revisits the related literature. Section VI concludes. All 
the proofs are delegated to online Appendices A and B.
I. The Baseline Model
The baseline model builds on Angeletos and La’O (2010). The economy consists 
of a “mainland” and a continuum of “islands.” Each island is inhabited by a contin-
uum of workers and a continuum of monopolistic firms. Firms employ local workers 
through a competitive labor market and produce differentiated commodities, which 
they ultimately sell in a centralized market in the mainland. The latter is inhabited 
by a continuum of consumers, each of whom is tied to one worker and one firm from 
every island in the economy. Along with the fact that there will be no heterogeneity 
within islands, this guarantees that the economy admits a representative household: 
we can think of the latter as a “big family” that is comprised of all agents, collects 
all income, and consumes all output in the economy. Nevertheless, this geography 
introduces an informational friction: we assume that firms and workers observe the 
fundamentals on their own island, but face incomplete information about the under-
lying aggregate shocks and the choices that other agents (their “siblings”) make on 
other islands. Finally, islands are indexed by  i ∈ I = [0, 1] ; firms, workers, and 
commodities by  (i, j ) ∈ I × J =  [0, 1] 2 ; and periods by  t ∈ {0, 1, 2,  … } .
A. Fundamentals
The utility of the representative household is given by
   =  ∑ 
t=0
∞
  β t [U( C t) −  ∫ I
 
  ∫ 
J
 
  χ it V ( n ijt ) djdi] , 
where  U(C ) =  1 _ 1 − γ  C 1−γ ,  V(n) =  1 _ 1 + ϵ n 1+ϵ , and  γ, ϵ ≥ 0 . Here,  n ijt is the labor 
input in firm  j of island  i (or the effort of the corresponding worker),  χ it is an 
island-specific shock to the disutility of labor, and  C t is aggregate consumption. The 
latter is given by the following nested CES structure:
  C t =  [ ∫ I
 
  ( c it )  ρ−1 ____ρ  di] 
 ρ ____ ρ−1
 ,  with  c it =  [ ∫ J
 
  ( c ijt )   η it −1 ____ η it   dj] 
  η it  ____  η it −1
 ∀ i, 
where  c ijt denotes the consumption of commodity  j from island  i ,  c it represents 
a composite of all the goods of island  i , and  ρ and  η identify the elasticities of 
substitution, respectively, across and within islands. In equilibrium,  ρ ends up con-
trolling the strength of aggregate demand externalities, while  η controls the degree 
of monopoly power. We let  η ≠ ρ so as to isolate the distinct roles of these two 
forces; we then let  η it be random so as to accommodate markup, or cost-push, 
shocks.
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Recall that the representative household receives labor income and profits from 
all islands in the economy. Its budget constraint is thus given by the following:
 ∫ 
I
 
  ∫ 
J
 
  p ijt  c ijt  djdj +  B t+1 ≤  ∫ I
 
  ∫ 
J
 
  π ijt  didj +  ∫ I
 
 (1 −  τ it )  w it  n it  di +  (1 +  R t ) B t +  T t . 
Here,  p ijt is the period- t price of the commodity produced by firm  j on island  i ,  π ijt 
is the period- t nominal profit of that firm,  w it is the period- t nominal wage on island 
i ,  R t is the period- t nominal net rate of return on the riskless bond, and  B  t is the 
amount of bonds held in period  t .
The variables  τ it and  T t satisfy  T t =  ∫ I  τ it  w it  n it  di. One can thus interpret  τ it as an 
island-specific distortionary tax and  T t as the lump-sum transfers needed to balance 
the budget. Alternatively, we can consider a variant of our model with monopo-
listic labor markets as in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), in which case  τ it could 
re-emerge as an island-specific markup between the wage and the marginal revenue 
product of labor. In line with much of the DSGE literature, we can thus introduce 
exogenous variation in  1 −  τ it and interpret this variation as shocks to the “labor 
wedge.”
Finally, the output of firm  j on island  i during period  t is given by
  y ijt =  A it  n ijt ,
where  A it is the island-specific TFP, and the firm’s realized profit is given 
by  π ijt =  p ijt  y ijt −  w it  n ijt . 
B. Information Structure
Different authors have motivated informational frictions on the basis of either mar-
ket segmentation (Lucas 1972; Lorenzoni 2009; Angeletos and La’O 2013) or some 
form of inattention (Sims 2003; Mankiw and Reis 2002; Woodford 2002; Mackowiak 
and Wiederholt 2009). In either case, the key friction is an agent-specific measur-
ability constraint, reflecting the dispersed private information upon which certain 
economic decisions are conditioned. In this paper we wish to understand the welfare 
effects of relaxing this constraint, not its possible micro-foundations. Furthermore, 
we seek to isolate the information about aggregate, as opposed to idiosyncratic, 
shocks, because it is only the former that have nontrivial general-equilibrium effects.
With these points in mind, we assume that the firms and workers of any given 
island know the local fundamentals, but have incomplete information about the 
aggregate state of the economy. We then model the available information as a com-
bination of private and public signals and proceed to characterize equilibrium wel-
fare as a function of the precisions of these signals. The details, and a justification, 
are provided in Section III. For now, we note that the results of Section II use only 
the weaker assumption that the stochastic structure is Gaussian.
II. Equilibrium, Welfare, and Coordination
The equilibrium is defined in a familiar manner: prices clear markets and quan-
tities are (privately) optimal given the available information. Following the same 
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steps as in Angeletos and La’O (2010),5 one can show that equilibrium output is 
pinned down by the following fixed-point relation:
(1)  χ it V ′ (  y it  _ A it ) =  1 _   it   피 it [ U ′ ( Y t) (  y it  _ Y t) 
− 1 _ρ ]  A it , 
where   it ≡  1 _ 1 −  τ it   
 η it  _  η it − 1 measures the overall wedge due to monopoly power, 
taxes, and/or labor-market distortions,  피 it denotes the expectation conditional 
on the information that is available to island  i , and  Y t denotes aggregate output (with  Y t =  C t , since there is no capital).
In the absence of informational frictions, condition (1) holds without the expec-
tation operator; in its presence, equilibrium outcomes diverge from their com-
plete-information counterparts insofar as aggregate output,  Y t , is not commonly 
known. Building on this observation, the following lemma helps reveal a formal 
connection between the positive properties of our model and those of the class of 
beauty-contest games studied by Morris and Shin (2002); Angeletos and Pavan 
(2007); and Bergemann and Morris (2013).
LEMMA 1: The equilibrium level of output is pinned down by the following fixed-
point relation:
(2)  log   y it =  ϕ 0 +  ϕ a  a it +  ϕ μ  μ it + α  피 it [log   Y t] ,  
where  ϕ 0 ,  ϕ a > 0 , and  ϕ μ < 0 are scalars,  a it ≡ log  A it −  1 _ 1 + ϵ log    χ it 
and  μ it ≡ log   it capture the local shocks, and
(3)  α ≡  1 − ρ γ ______
1 + ρ ϵ < 1. 
Condition (2), which is simply a log-linear transformation of condition (1), is 
formally identical to the best-response condition that characterizes the aforemen-
tioned class of beauty-contest games. In the context of these games, the scalar  α 
identifies the degree of strategic complementarity and encapsulates the private value 
of coordination: it measures how much the players in the game (the firms in our 
model) care to align their actions (their production levels).
In an abstract game, this scalar can be a free variable. In our setting, it is pinned 
down by the underlying micro-foundations and it reflects the balance of two forces. 
On the one hand, an increase in aggregate income raises the demand faced by each 
firm, which stimulates firm profits, production, and employment; this effect cap-
tures the “aggregate demand externality.” On the other hand, an increase in aggre-
gate income discourages labor supply and raises real wages, which has the opposite 
effect on firm profits, production, and employment. In our view, the most plausible 
scenario is one in which the former effect dominates, so that  α > 0 . To simplify the 
exposition, the comparative statics of volatility and dispersion in Proposition 2 focus 
5 The equilibrium characterization of the baseline model, and a variant of Lemma 1, can also be found in 
Angeletos and La’O (2010). Our contribution starts with the welfare decomposition in Lemma 2. 
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on this case. However, our key welfare results (Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4) hold true 
regardless of the sign and the precise value of  α . They only require  α < 1 , a qualifi-
cation that is henceforth omitted because it is necessarily satisfied for all admissible 
values of the underlying preference and technology parameters.
Lemma 1 permits one to characterize the positive properties of our baseline 
model as a direct translation of the positive properties of the aforementioned class 
of beauty-contest games. For example, one can readily show that a higher  α maps 
to higher sensitivity of equilibrium production to noisy public news and therefore 
also to higher non-fundamental volatility; this mirrors a similar result in Morris and 
Shin (2002). Alternatively, following Bergemann and Morris (2013), one can show 
that the entire set of equilibrium allocations that obtain under arbitrary Gaussian 
information structures can be spanned with the two-dimensional signal structure we 
specify in the next section.
None of these facts, however, informs us about the normative properties of our 
model. To understand these properties, we develop a certain decomposition of the 
welfare losses that obtain in equilibrium relative to the first best. Let  y it ∗ and  Y t ∗ 
denote the first-best levels of, respectively, local and aggregate output; these are 
pinned down by the variant of condition (1) that sets   it = 1 and that lets  Y t be 
commonly known. Next, define the corresponding local and aggregate gaps by, 
respectively,  log  y ̃it ≡ log  y it − log  y it ∗ and  log  Y ̃ t ≡ log  Y t − log  Y t ∗ , and let
  Σ ≡ Var (log  Y ̃ t )  and σ ≡ Var (log  y ̃it − log  Y ̃t ) , 
measure, respectively, the volatility of the aggregate gap and the cross-sectional dis-
persion in local gaps.6 Next, let  Y 
– ≡ 피 [Y ] denote the mean, or “steady-state,” level 
of output. Finally, consider, as a reference point, the allocation that obtains when the 
mean wedge  μ – is chosen so as to maximize welfare and let  Y ˆ denote the associated 
mean level of output; as in the New-Keynesian policy literature, this reference point 
abstracts from distortions in the steady state and can be attained with the introduc-
tion of an appropriate noncontingent subsidy on employment or income. We can 
then reach the following characterization of equilibrium welfare.
LEMMA 2: There exist functions  v, w  :   핉 + → 핉 , which are invariant to the 
information structure, such that equilibrium welfare is given by
   = v (Δ)w (Λ) ,
where
(4)  Δ ≡   Y – __ Y ˆ and Λ ≡ Σ +  
1 _ 
1 − α σ. 
Furthermore,  attains its maximum (the first-best level) at  Δ = 1 and  Λ = 0 , is 
strictly concave in  Δ and strictly decreasing in  Λ .
6 In the literature, it is customary to recast  σ as a measure of dispersion in relative prices. Such a transformation 
is valid in our setting but is not needed for our purposes. 
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To interpret this lemma, note that  v(Δ) captures the welfare loss caused by any 
distortion in the mean level of economic activity, whereas  w(Λ) captures the loss due 
to volatility in the aggregate output gap and/or due to cross-sectional  misallocation. 
The first loss disappears when  Δ = 1  (equivalently,  Y – =  Y ˆ) , the second when Λ = 0 (equivalently,  Σ = σ = 0 ).7
This lemma and a set of companion results we provide in Section IV extend the 
kind of welfare decompositions that are familiar in the New-Keynesian framework 
(Woodford 2003; Galí 2008) to the incomplete-information economies we are inter-
ested in. While these decompositions need not be surprising on their own right, and 
variants of them have appeared in all the related prior work, they serve two purposes. 
First, they help identify the different channels through which information can affect 
welfare. Second, they complete the mapping between the macroeconomic models 
of interest and the abstract games studied in Morris and Shin (2002); Angeletos and 
Pavan (2007); and Bergemann and Morris (2013), thus also clarifying whether there 
is any discrepancy between the private and the social value of coordination in the 
macroeconomic models of interest.
The first point will become evident as we proceed, especially once we add nom-
inal rigidity. To understand the second point, consider any of the games studied in 
the above papers and momentarily recast  Σ and  σ as, respectively, the volatility and 
the dispersion of the gaps between the equilibrium and the first-best actions in that 
game. Following Angeletos and Pavan (2007), the combined welfare loss due to 
these gaps can be shown to be proportional to the following sum:
  Λ = Σ +  1 _ 
1 −  α ∗ σ, 
where  α ∗ is a scalar that depends on the payoff structure of the game and that encap-
sulates the social value of coordination.8 In general, this scalar may differ from the 
one that measures the degree of strategic complementarity, reflecting a divergence 
between private and social motives to coordinate. In the light of Lemmas 1 and 2, 
however, our economy maps to a game in which  α =  α ∗ , meaning that there is no 
such divergence.9
PROPERTY 1: In our setting, the private value of coordination coincides with its 
social counterpart.
This property underscores a crucial difference between our setting and that of 
Morris and Shin (2002). In their game, it is assumed that  α ∗  = 0 < α ; that is, the 
7 In addition, we normalize  v(1 )  = 1 . It follows  w(0 ) coincides with the first-best level of welfare. 
8 Formally,  α ∗ is defined as the degree of strategy complementarity in a fictitious game whose equilibrium strat-
egy coincides with the strategy that maximizes welfare in the economy under consideration; it therefore reflects how 
much agents should care to coordinate, as opposed to how much they actually do care in equilibrium. 
9 The mapping between our model and Angeletos and Pavan (2007) is complicated by the fact that the  Δ term can 
vary with the available information in our setting, a kind of effect that is not accommodated by the linear-quadratic 
framework of Angeletos and Pavan (2007). This complication turns out to be inconsequential in the case of technol-
ogy shocks, but not in the case of markup shocks. See Proposition 4 and the discussion surrounding this proposition. 
Also, for the case of technology shocks, the coincidence of  α and  α ∗ was first pointed out in Angeletos and La’O 
(2010) by comparing directly the equilibrium to the constrained efficient allocation. That paper, however, did not 
arrive at the precise mapping between the welfare effects of information in our setting and those in Angeletos and 
Pavan (2007), nor did it consider the extension with nominal rigidity we consider in Section IV. 
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private motives to coordinate are socially wasteful by design. The micro-foundations 
of our setting, instead, imply that  α ∗ = α > 0 ; that is, the private incentives to coor-
dinate are perfectly aligned with their social counterparts, as if by the magic of the 
invisible hand. As we explain in the next section, this alignment is also key to under-
standing why the combined effect of information on  Λ turns out to be unambiguous, 
even though its component effects on volatility and dispersion are ambiguous in 
general and are often in conflict with one another.
III. The Effects of Information on Volatility, Dispersion, and Welfare
In this section, we characterize the comparative statics of the volatility measure 
Σ , the dispersion measure  σ , and overall welfare  with respect to the information 
structure. We do so by distinguishing two polar cases. In the first, the underlying 
fundamental uncertainty is over technology or preferences. In the second, it is over 
monopoly power or labor wedges. The first case captures the scenario in which 
the business cycle would have been efficient had information been complete; in 
this case,  Σ and  σ are nonzero only due to the incompleteness of information. The 
second case captures the scenario in which the business cycle originates from dis-
tortions in product and labor markets; in this case,  Σ and  σ reflect the combination 
of the informational friction with such distortions.
A. Efficient Fluctuations
In this part, we fix   it =  ‾   for all ( i, t ) and concentrate on the case of tech-
nology shocks. (The case of preference shocks is identical in terms of welfare.)
To facilitate sharp comparative statics, we specify the stochastic structure as 
follows. First, we let local productivity be  a it ≡ log  A it =  a – t +  ξ it , where  a – t is an 
aggregate shock and  ξ it is an idiosyncratic shock. The aggregate shock  a – t is i.i.d. 
over time, drawn from    (0,  σ a 2 ) , while the idiosyncratic shock  ξ it is i.i.d. across 
both  t and  i , independent of  a – t , and drawn from    (0,  σ ξ 2) . Next, we summarize 
all of the private (local) information of island  i regarding the underlying aggregate 
shock  a – t in an island-specific signal  x it given by
(5)  x it =  a – t +  u it ,  
where the noise term  u it is i.i.d. across  i and  t , orthogonal to  a – t , and drawn from   (0,  σ x 2) .10 Similarly, we summarize all of the public (aggregate) information in a 
public signal  z  t given by
(6)  z t =  a – t +  ε t ,  
10 Note that local productivity is itself a private signal of aggregate productivity. The sufficient statistic  x it is 
meant to include this information. More precisely,  x it ≡ (1 − ω)  a it + ω  x it ′ , where  x it ′ =  a – +  u it ′ is a signal that cap-
tures any private information other than the one contained in local productivity;  u it ′ is the noise in that signal, which 
is i.i.d. across  i and  t , orthogonal to  a – t and  ξ it , and drawn from    (0,  σ x ′2 ) ;  σ x −2 ≡  σ ξ −2 +  σ x ′ −2 ; and  ω ≡  σ x ′ −2/ σ x −2 . 
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where the noise term  ε t is i.i.d. across  t , orthogonal to all other shocks, and drawn 
from    (0,  σ z 2) . Finally, to ease notation, we let  κ a ≡  σ a −2 ,  κ ξ ≡  σ ξ −2 ,  κ x ≡  σ x −2 , 
and  κ z ≡  σ z −2 .
The subsequent analysis focuses on the comparative statics of the equilibrium 
volatility, dispersion, and welfare with respect to the scalars  κ x and  κ z , which mea-
sure the precisions of, respectively, the available private and public information. 
When interpreting our results, however, it is worth keeping in mind the follow-
ing point. As noted before, the results of Bergemann and Morris (2013) guarantee 
that the equilibrium allocation obtained by any Gaussian information structure can 
always be replicated with an information structure like the one specified above. This 
means that the adopted specification is without serious loss of generality and that 
the scalars  κ x and  κ z represent more generally a convenient parameterization of the 
information structure.
Prior work has often emphasized the different effects that each type of informa-
tion can have on volatility and dispersion. We thus start by revisiting these effects in 
the context of our model.
PROPOSITION 1: (i) An increase in  κ z necessarily reduces dispersion  σ , whereas it 
reduces volatility  Σ if and only if  κ z is high enough. (ii) Symmetrically, an increase 
in  κ x necessarily reduces  Σ , whereas it reduces  σ if and only if  κ x is high enough.
To understand part (i), note that an increase in the precision of public information 
induces firms and workers to reduce their reliance on their private signals, which in 
turn reduces the contribution of idiosyncratic noise to cross-sectional dispersion. 
At the same time, because these agents increase their reliance on public signals, the 
contribution of public information to aggregate output gaps is ambiguous: the reduc-
tion in the level of the noise itself tends to reduce  Σ , while the increased reaction of 
the agents tends to raise  Σ . Which effect dominates depends on how large the noise 
is, which explains part (i). The intuition for part (ii) is symmetric.
Although each type of information can have a negative effect on either volatility 
or dispersion, the combined welfare effect is unambiguously positive:  Λ necessarily 
decreases with either  κ x or  κ z . Along with the fact that  Δ turns out to be invariant to 
the information structure,11 this gives us the following result.
THEOREM 1: Suppose the business cycle is driven by technology shocks. 
Welfare necessarily increases with the precision of either public or private infor-
mation, for all  α . Moreover, when  α > 0 , the marginal welfare benefit of public 
information increases with  α , that is,   ∂ 2  _∂ α ∂ κ z  > 0 .
As anticipated, this result owes its sharpness to the coincidence of the private and 
social values of coordination and can thus can be seen as a variant of Proposition 6 
in Angeletos and Pavan (2007). If the scalar that governs the relative contribution 
of volatility and dispersion in  Λ were lower from the one that governs the strategic 
complementarity ( α ∗ < α ), then public information would have a non-monotone 
11 The intuition for this particular property is discussed in the context of Proposition 4 below. 
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welfare effect, in line with the result of Morris and Shin (2002); and if the con-
verse were true ( α ∗ > α ), then it would be private information that would have a 
non-monotone welfare effect. It is thus Property 1 that explains why both types of 
information have a similar and unambiguously welfare effect in our setting.12
B. Inefficient Fluctuations
We now shift focus to the case of inefficient fluctuations, which we capture 
with shocks to monopoly markups (or, equivalently, to labor wedges). We thus 
fix  A it =  χ it = 1 for all  (i, t) and let the log of the local wedge be given by
  μ it ≡ log   it =  μ – t +  ξ it ,  
where  μ – t is an aggregate component and  ξ it is an idiosyncratic component. The for-
mer is i.i.d. across  t , drawn from    ( μ – ,  σ μ 2 ) ; the latter is i.i.d. across both  t and  i , 
independent of  μ – t , and drawn from    (0,  σ ξ 2) . Finally, we let  κ μ ≡  σ μ −2 and model 
the information structure in the same way as in the previous section: the available 
signals are given by (5) and (6), replacing  a –t with  μ – t .
In the case of the technology shocks, equilibrium allocations could fluctuate 
away from the first best only because of the incompleteness of information. Here, 
by contrast, the entire variation in equilibrium allocations represents a deviation 
from the first best, no matter whether this variation originates in the noise or in the 
fundamentals themselves. The comparative statics of the resulting volatility and dis-
persion measures are described below.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose  α > 0 . (i) Volatility  Σ increases with either  κ x or  κ z . (ii) Dispersion  σ decreases with  κ z , and is generally non-monotone in  κ x .
In spite of the possible conflict between the component effects, Property 1 guar-
antees that the combined effect is once again unambiguous—but now of the oppo-
site sign than in the case of technology shocks.
PROPOSITION 3: The combined welfare loss due to volatility and dispersion, as 
captured by  Λ , increases with either  κ x or  κ z , for all  α .
As before, it is useful to relate the above finding to Angeletos and Pavan (2007). 
Corollary 9 of that paper uses an abstract example in which  α ∗ = α = 0 to illus-
trate the basic insight that information can be detrimental for welfare when it regards 
shocks that only move the complete-information equilibrium away from the first 
best. However, by leaving open the possibility that  α ∗ ≠ α in workhorse macro-
economic models, and in fact conjecturing that  α <  α ∗ , that paper also left open 
the door for ambiguous welfare effects. Similarly to Theorem 1, the above result 
12 Theorem 1 can also be inferred from the result in Angeletos and La’O (2010) that the equilibrium is 
constrained efficient in the absence of markup shocks. This, however, does not extend to the rest of our results 
(Theorems 2, 3, and 4). 
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therefore owes its sharpness to Property 1, the coincidence of the private and social 
values of coordination.
Welfare depends not only on  Λ , which we characterized above, but also on  Δ . In 
the case of technology shocks,  Δ was pinned down by the mean wedge   – , and was 
invariant to the information structure. Here, instead,  Δ varies with the level of noise.
PROPOSITION 4:  Δ increases with either  κ x or  κ z , for all  α .
This finding can be explained as follows. The uncertainty that firms face in pre-
dicting aggregate demand affects the mean level of economic activity, due to curva-
ture at both the firm level (curvature of the profit function) and the aggregate level 
(imperfect substitutability across products). This effect is present irrespective of the 
nature of the underlying aggregate shocks. Its welfare consequences, however, hinge 
on the nature of the shocks. In the case of technology shocks, the equilibrium use of 
information is socially optimal and this effect does not represent a distortion, which 
explains why  Δ does not vary with the information structure. In the case of markup 
shocks, instead, the planner would prefer the agents not to respond to the underlying 
uncertainty and the aforementioned effect is thus associated with an increase in  Δ .
Recall that welfare is strictly convex in  Δ , with a maximum attained at  Δ = 1 . It 
follows that the aforementioned effect represents a welfare loss when  Δ > 1 and a 
welfare gain when  Δ < 1 . In the former case, this effect therefore complements the 
one of  Λ . In the latter case, instead, the two effects conflict with each other. Which 
one dominates then depends on the distance of  Δ from the bliss point  Δ = 1 . 
Finally, this point is itself attained if the planner has at his disposal a fiscal instru-
ment that permits him to control the mean level of output, such as a noncontingent 
subsidy on employment, output, or sales. We thus reach the following result.
THEOREM 2: Suppose the business cycle is driven by markup shocks. There exists 
a threshold  Δ ˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that welfare decreases with the precision of either pub-
lic or private information if and only if  Δ >  Δ ˆ . Furthermore, the latter condition 
holds, with  Δ = 1 , if a noncontingent subsidy is available and set optimally.
It is interesting to note that the threshold  Δ ˆ is pinned down solely by preference 
and technology parameters and it is the same whether we consider the effect of 
private information or that of public information. This kind of symmetry between 
the two types of information is yet another symptom of Property 1: no matter which 
case we have considered, this property has guaranteed that the distinction between 
private and public information is inconsequential for the question of interest.
We conclude this section by noting that it is customary in the literature to shut 
down any “steady-state” distortion (that is, to set  Δ = 1 ) by assuming from scratch 
the presence of the noncontingent subsidy. Although the effect on  Δ documented 
above may be of interest in its own right, in the sequel we also opt to abstract from 
it and, instead, extend the analysis in the direction of adding nominal rigidity and 
studying the role of monetary policy.
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IV. Nominal Rigidity and Monetary Policy
In the preceding analysis we isolated the role of the informational friction as a 
source of real rigidity. We now extend the analysis to the more realistic scenario in 
which the informational friction is also a source of nominal rigidity: firms set their 
nominal prices on the basis of the kind of noisy private and public signals that were 
featured in our preceding analysis.
A. Setup
As usual, the introduction of nominal rigidity requires that we allow a margin of 
adjustment in quantities: at least one input must be free to adjust to realized demand, 
or else markets would fail to clear at the posted prices. Accordingly, we allow for 
two types of labor: one that is chosen on the basis of incomplete information, thus 
preserving the type of real rigidity that was at the core of our baseline model; and 
another that adjusts freely to the underlying state of nature, thus preserving market 
clearing in the presence of the nominal rigidity.
More specifically, the output of the typical firm in island  i is now given by
  y it =  A it  n it θ  ℓ it η ,
where  n it is the labor input that is chosen on the basis of incomplete information (as 
in our baseline analysis),  ℓ it is the alternative input that adjusts to the realized state (so that markets can clear), and  θ and  η are positive scalars, with  θ + η ≤ 1 . One 
may think of  n it as bodies of employed workers whom the firm hires on the basis 
of incomplete information and of  ℓ it as labor utilization, overtime work, or other 
margins that adjust to realized demand. The precise interpretation of these inputs, 
however, is not essential. Rather, the essence is to accommodate the two types of 
rigidity we are interested in. A useful feature of the presumed specification is that 
it helps nest the scenario studied in prior work as the extreme case in which  θ = 0 
(meaning that all output is free to adjust to the realized state).
We next let the per-period utility of the representative household be given by the 
following sum:
  1 _ 1 − γ  C t 1−γ −  1 _ 1 +  ϵ n  ∫ I
 
  n it 1+ ϵ n  di −  1 _ 1 +  ϵ ℓ   ∫ I
 
  ℓ it 1+ ϵ ℓ  di, 
where  ϵ n and  ϵ ℓ are positive scalars that parameterize the Frisch elasticities of the 
two types of labor. To simplify, and without serious loss, we let  ϵ n =  ϵ ℓ = ϵ .
Note that curvature in both the utility function and in the production function in the 
two types of inputs ensures that the alternative input  ℓ it cannot be a perfect substitute 
for  n it . That is, while  ℓ it adjusts to the realized state, it cannot fully undo the effect of 
the predetermined labor input  n it .
Consider now the specification of monetary policy. In general, this opens the 
door to delicate modeling issues. What is the information upon which the monetary 
authority acts? Does this contain only signals of the exogenous shocks or also sig-
nals of endogenous economic outcomes? What are the objectives, targets, or policy 
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rules that guide the policymaker? How one chooses to answer these questions is 
bound to affect the welfare properties of the model. In what follows, we develop a 
taxonomy that seeks to dissect the role of different monetary policies, without how-
ever getting into the granular details of how policy is conducted.
We assume that the policy instrument is the nominal interest rate and allow the 
latter to follow an arbitrary stochastic process. We only require that this process is 
log-normal in order to maintain the Gaussian structure of the equilibrium. Following 
the tradition of the Ramsey literature, we then adopt an approach that permits us to 
span directly the set of all the allocations that can obtain in equilibrium under such 
an arbitrary monetary policy. The benefit of this approach is its flexibility; the cost 
is that it suppresses the question of what exactly it takes for the policymaker to be 
able to implement a particular allocation.
To economize on space, the characterization of the set of allocations that can be 
implemented with arbitrary monetary policies is delegated to online Appendix B 
(see Section B1 and Lemmas 6–8 therein). To facilitate the subsequent analysis, 
we nevertheless need a “topography” of this set, that is, a way to index the different 
points in it. We provide such a topography in the next lemma.
LEMMA 3: (i) In any equilibrium, nominal GDP satisfies
(7)  log  M t =  λ s  s –t +  λ z  z t +  m t ,  
where  λ s and  λ z are scalars,  s –t stands for either the technology or markup shock, 
and  m t is a random variable that is drawn from    (0,  σ m 2 ) , for some  σ m ≥ 0 , and is 
orthogonal to both  s –t and  z  t .(ii) Suppose that the interest rate satisfies
(8)  log (1 +  R  t ) =  ρ s  s –t +  ρ z  z  t +  r t ,  
where  ρ s and  ρ z are scalars and  r t is a random variable that is drawn from    (0,  σ r 2) 
for some  σ r ≥ 0 , and is orthogonal to both  s ̅t and  z  t  . For any triplet  ( λ s ,  λ z ,  σ m ), 
there exists a monetary policy as in (8) such that (7) holds in the equilibrium induced 
by this policy.
(iii) A policy as in  (8 ) can replicate the equilibrium allocation induced by any 
other policy.
Part (i) follows from regressing the equilibrium value of nominal GDP on the 
fundamental and the public signal, and letting  ( λ s ,  λ z ) be the projection coefficients 
and  m t the residual. This part is therefore trivial, but it is useful for our purposes 
because in conjunction with the rest of the lemma it permits us to index different 
equilibria with different values for the triplet  ( λ s ,  λ z ,  σ m ) . Parts (ii) and (iii) then 
provide us with a class of monetary policies that can implement any value for this 
triplet and that span the entire set of the allocations that obtain under arbitrary mon-
etary policies.
Although it is possible to interpret condition (8) as a policy rule, one can also 
arrive to it from a different specification of how policy is conducted. For instance, 
suppose that the monetary authority adheres to the following Taylor rule:
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  log (1 +  R  t ) =  r z  z t +  r y  (log  Y t +  ϵ t y ) +  r p  (log  P t +  ϵ t p ) +  r ̃t , 
where  ( r z ,  r y ,  r p ) are policy coefficients,  ϵ t y and  ϵ t p are measurement errors in the mon-
etary authority’s observation of real output and the price level, and  r ̃t is a monetary 
shock. Once one solves for equilibrium output and prices, the above reduces to 
condition (8), with  ( ρ  s – ,  ρ z ) being functions of the policy coefficients  ( r z ,  r y ,  r p ) and  r t 
being a mixture of the monetary shock  r ̃t and the measurement errors  ( ϵ t y ,  ϵ t p ) . In 
a nutshell, condition (8) can always be recast as a representation of the equilibrium 
implemented by any given policy rule.
Furthermore, although condition (8) requires that the interest rate react to the 
current technology or markup shock, such a contemporaneous reaction is not strictly 
needed for the policymaker to implement a particular response in macroeconomic 
activity to the shock. Rather, it suffices that monetary policy reacts at some point in 
the future: Lemma 7 in online Appendix B establishes that the entire set of imple-
mentable allocations remains the same whether monetary policy responds within the 
same period or with a lag. This follows directly from iterating the Euler equation 
and noting that current consumption depends on the entire path of future nominal 
interest rates. As a result, it makes no difference whether the desired movements in 
aggregate demand are implemented by moving the current interest rate or by com-
mitting to move future rates.13
These points underscore that conditions (7) and (8) are equivalent representations 
of all the equilibrium allocations that can obtain under arbitrary monetary policies. 
We have found (7) to be most convenient for our purposes, for reasons that will 
become evident in the statement of the formal results in this section, as well as in the 
discussion of the related literature in the next section.14
To close the model, we must specify the information upon which firms can con-
dition their production and pricing decisions. As in the baseline model, we assume 
that this is summarized by a pair of signals about the underlying fundamental: the 
public signal  z t and the private signal  x t . We proceed to investigate the comparative 
statics of welfare with respect to the corresponding precisions,  κ x and  κ z . Note that 
this rules out the possibility that the firms also have information about the shock  m t , 
which can be interpreted as a monetary shock. This alternative kind of information 
is the subject matter of Hellwig (2005) and is briefly discussed at a later point.
B. A Familiar Benchmark
Consider, as a reference point, the hypothetical scenario in which the nominal 
rigidity is removed, by which we mean the case in which  p it is free to adjust to the 
realized state. This scenario is henceforth referred to as “flexible prices” and the 
equilibrium allocation that obtains under it as the “flexible-price allocation.” The 
13 This property is not specific to our model; it is a standard feature of the New-Keynesian framework and 
underlies the argument about “forward guidance” at the zero lower bound. Investigating the realism or the robust-
ness of this property is however beyond the scope of this paper. 
14 Some papers, such as Woodford (2002) and Hellwig (2005), treat  M t as an exogenous random process. 
Others, such as Baeriswyl and Conrand (2010), assume that the policy instrument is  M t rather than the interest rate. 
Our approach can accommodate these possibilities, but is not limited to them. 
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next lemma identifies a set of monetary policies that implement this allocation when 
the nominal rigidity is present.
LEMMA 4: There exists a pair  ( λ s ∗,  ρ ∗ ) such that a monetary policy replicates flex-
ible prices if (7) holds with  λ s =  λ s ∗ and  σ m = 0 or, equivalently, if (8) holds 
with  ρ s =  ρ ∗ and  σ r = 0 .
This lemma is a special case of a more general result in Angeletos and La’O 
(2014): just as in the baseline New-Keynesian framework there are monetary pol-
icies that can undo the nominal rigidity induced by Calvo-like sticky prices, in the 
class of incomplete-information models studied here (and in related papers) there 
are monetary policies that can undo the nominal rigidity induced by informational 
frictions. These policies presume that the policymaker can observe the aggregate 
state perfectly, although perhaps with a time lag, and that she has perfect control 
over aggregate demand. These policies are therefore not particularly realistic. They 
nevertheless represent a useful benchmark, separating the informational friction of 
the market from any friction on the policymaker’s side, and facilitating sharp wel-
fare conclusions.15
When these policies are in place, information matters only through the real rigid-
ity. This suggests a connection to our baseline analysis, which we formalize next. 
Let  q it ≡  A it  n it θ denote the component of output that is determined on the basis of 
incomplete information. Next, define the corresponding aggregate as
  Q t ≡  [ ∫ I
 
  ( q it )   ρ ˆ −1 ____ ρ ˆ   di] 
  ρ ˆ  ____  ρ ˆ −1
 , 
and finally let
(9)  α ˆ ≡  1 −  ρ ˆ  γ ˆ ______
1 +  ρ ˆ  ϵ ˆ  ,  
where  ϵ ˆ ≡  1 + ϵ − θ _θ ,  γ ˆ ≡ 1 −  
 (1 − γ)  (1 + ϵ)   _
1 + ϵ − η (1 − γ)  , and  ρ ˆ ≡  
ρ (1 + ϵ − η) + η  _
1 + ϵ + η(1 − ρ ) are transfor-
mations of the underlying preference and technology parameters. Similarly to the 
baseline model, we can verify that  α ˆ < 1 for all preference and technology param-
eters, and can obtain the following characterization of the flexible-price allocation.
PROPOSITION 5: Consider the flexible-price allocation and let  q it and  Q t be the 
quantities defined above.
(i) There exist scalars  ϕ ˆ a > 0,  ϕ ˆ μ < 0, and  ϕ ˆ  μ –  such that, for any information 
structure, the equilibrium  q it is determined by the solution to the following:
(10)  log  q it  =   ϕ ˆ a  a it +  ϕ ˆ μ  μ it +  ϕ ˆ  μ –   피 it [  μ – t ] +  α ˆ  피 it [ log  Q t ].  
15 Our analysis also abstracts from any interference the nominal rigidity may have with the response to sectoral 
or idiosyncratic shocks, or from other types of relative-price distortions that monetary policy may be unable to 
correct even when the policymaker observes perfectly the state. 
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(ii) There exists a decreasing function  w such that, for any information structure, 
equilibrium welfare is given by   = w(Λ) , where
(11)  Λ = Σ +  1 _____ 
1 −  α ˆ σ + ω,  
where  Σ and  σ are defined in the same way as in the baseline model, modulo replac-
ing output  y with the component  q defined above and the scalar  α with the scalar  α ˆ , 
and where  ω is a scalar that does not depend on either  κ x or  κ z and that vanishes in 
the absence of markup shocks.
This result extends Lemmas 1 and 2 from the baseline model to the flexible-price 
allocation of the extended model, with conditions (10) and (11) being the analogues 
of, respectively, conditions (2) and (4) of the baseline model.
If we compare condition (10) to condition (2), we see three differences. First,  q it 
and  Q t have taken the place of, respectively,  y it and  Y t . This is because it is only  q it (or  n it ), not  y it , that is restricted to depend on incomplete information. Second, the 
hatted scalars  α ˆ ,  ρ ˆ , etc. have taken the place of the corresponding un-hatted scalars 
in the baseline model. This reflects the more general specification of preferences 
and technologies. Finally, a new term has emerged: in addition to the firm’s own 
markup, the expected aggregate markup enters the firm’s best-response condition. 
This is because the realized aggregate markup affects the realized aggregate output 
for any given  Q  t , implying in turn that a firm’s optimal choice of  q it depends directly 
on its expectation of  μ – t .
Comparing now condition (11) to condition (4), we see that a new term shows up 
also in the definition of  Λ . Even if we hold constant the entire cross-sectional profile 
of  q it , the realized markup distorts the firms’ choice of  ℓ it . This explains why  Λ con-
tains not only the terms  Σ and  σ but also the new term  ω in condition (11), which is 
proportional to the volatility of the markup shock.
Notwithstanding these differences in the micro-foundations of conditions (10) 
and (11), the scalar  α ˆ that captures the strategic complementarity in (10) continues 
to determine the relative welfare costs of volatility and dispersion in condition (11). 
The following variant of Property 1 therefore holds in the extended model.
PROPERTY 2: The private and the social value of coordination coincide as long as 
monetary policy replicates flexible prices.
This observation leads once again to a sharp answer to the question of interest. 
Insofar as monetary policy replicates flexible prices,  ℓ it choice adjusts to the real-
ized supply and demand conditions as if information were complete. The  ω term 
in (11) is therefore invariant to  κ x and  κ z , and can be ignored for our purposes. 
Consider now the case of technology shocks. In this case,  q it solves exactly the same 
fixed-point relation as  y it did in the baseline model, guaranteeing that the mapping 
from the information structure to the equilibrium values of  Σ,  σ , and  Λ are also the 
same, modulo the replacement of the scalars  α and  ϕ a with their hatted counterparts. 
When instead the business cycle is driven by markup shocks, the presence of the 
aggregate markup in condition (10) breaks the equivalence between the two models. 
Nevertheless, because this term is just a different facet of the distortionary effects of 
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markup shocks, it does not interfere with the essence of the lessons of the baseline 
model. We thus arrive to the following extension of Theorems 1 and 2.
THEOREM 3: Suppose monetary policy replicates flexible prices. Welfare increases 
with both types of information in the case of technology shocks, and decreases with 
them in the case of markup shocks.
C. Away from the Benchmark
We now turn to policies that deviate from replicating flexible prices. From 
Lemma 3, any such deviation contains at most three components: one perfectly cor-
related with the fundamental; one perfectly correlated with the public signal; and 
a residual, which may be interpreted as a monetary shock. The second component 
has no welfare consequences, because the dependence of policy on  z t is commonly 
predictable when firms set prices and can thus have no real effect. We thus reach the 
following decomposition of welfare for any monetary policy.
PROPOSITION 6: There exists a decreasing function  w such that, for any policy 
and any information structure, the equilibrium level of welfare is given by
   = w(Λ +  +   ), 
where the following are true:
(i)  Λ is the welfare loss at the flexible-price allocation.
(ii)   is the welfare effect of  λ s  ≠   λ s ∗ and can be expressed as   =  ( λ s ) , where
(12)  ( λ s ) ≡  { 
Θ  ( λ s −  λ s ∗) 2  σ a 2 with technology shocks       [− 2  Θ 1 ( λ s −  λ s ∗) +  Θ 2  ( λ s −  λ s ∗ ) 2 ]  σ μ 2 with markup shocks  
and where  Θ ,  Θ 1 , and  Θ 2 are scalars that depend on  ( κ x ,  κ z ) and that vanish 
as  κ x → ∞ or  κ z → ∞ .(iii)  is the welfare loss caused by  σ m ≠ 0 .
This result complements our earlier welfare decompositions and formalizes the 
sense in which the two forms of rigidity map into two channels through which infor-
mation affects welfare: the role of the real rigidity is captured by  Λ ; the additional 
effect of the nominal rigidity is captured by the sum   +  . This sum is nonzero 
only insofar as monetary policy deviates from the benchmark of replicating flexible 
prices. By contrast,  Λ is necessarily positive.16
As already mentioned,  captures the welfare consequences of  m t , or equiva-
lently of  r t . The latter represents a deviation that is orthogonal to both the under-
lying fundamental and the public signal—a deviation that can be interpreted as a 
16 With the exemption, of course, of the limit case in which  θ = 0 : without real rigidity,  Λ = 0 . 
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monetary shock or a policy “mistake.” Whatever the interpretation,   is necessarily 
nonnegative and independent of the available information about  s –t  . By contrast,   
depends on that information precisely because it captures the deviations that are cor-
related with  s –t . Furthermore, both the sign and the comparative statics of this term 
with respect to the available information depend on the nature of the underlying 
business-cycle forces.
From part (ii), we see that the minimum of  is zero and it is attained at  λ s =  λ s ∗
when the business cycle is driven by technology shocks, whereas it is positive and 
it is attained at  λ s ≠  λ s ∗ when the business cycle is driven by markup shocks. This 
verifies that a familiar policy lesson extends from the New-Keynesian setting to the 
present framework.
PROPERTY 3: A monetary policy that replicates flexible prices is optimal in the 
case of technology shocks, but not in the case of markup shocks.
Notwithstanding the similarity to the New-Keynesian framework, the following 
difference is worth mentioning in the case of technology shocks: unless the real 
rigidity is shut down ( θ = 0 ), replicating flexible prices does not implement the 
first-best allocation, nor is it synonymous to targeting price stability.17
Turning to the case of markup shocks, certain deviations from the flexible-price 
allocation are welfare-improving because they substitute for a missing tax instru-
ment, namely the state-contingent subsidy that would have offset the markup shock. 
The only key difference from the New-Keynesian framework then is that, since the 
nominal rigidity originates in an informational friction rather than Calvo-like sticky 
prices, the ability of the monetary authority to counter the markup shock hinges on 
its ability to respond to information that is not available to the firms when the latter 
set their prices. This suggests that more precise information in the firms’ hands may 
contribute toward lower welfare not only by reducing the “base” level of welfare 
that obtains in the flexible-price allocation but also by limiting the ability of the 
monetary authority to counteract the markup shock.18 As it turns out, however, this 
intuition is only partially correct.
LEMMA 5: Suppose the business cycle is driven by markup shocks. The optimal 
policy corresponds to  λ s =  λ s ∗∗ and  σ m = 0 , where  λ s ∗∗ ≡ arg   min  λ s   ( λ s ). Let 
K( κ x ,  κ z ) denote this minimum, as a function of the precisions of information.(i) Suppose  θ = 0 . Then,  K( κ x ,  κ z ) is increasing in both  κ x and  κ z .(ii) Suppose  θ > 0 . There are values of the preferences and technology parame-
ters for which  K( κ x ,  κ z ) is non-monotone in either  κ x or  κ z .(iii) Suppose  θ > 0 and let  K –(κ, ϱ) be the function defined by  K( κ x ,  κ z ) along the 
locus of  ( κ x ,  κ z ) such that  κ x +  κ z = κ and   κ x  _  κ μ +  κ z = ϱ . Then,  K 
–(κ, ϱ) increases in 
κ , but is non-monotone in  ϱ .
17 For more details on these points, see Angeletos and La’O (2014). 
18 The latter possibility is also highlighted in Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010), albeit in a model that adds a cer-
tain friction in the conduct of monetary policy. As explained in Section V, this friction is the key to understanding 
why that paper does not reach the kind of unambiguous result we obtain in part (i) of Lemma 5 below. 
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Part (i) verifies the aforementioned intuition in the special case in which the real 
rigidity is absent; as already mentioned, this is the case considered in prior work. Part 
(ii) establishes that the intuition can be overturned once the real rigidity is present. 
Part (iii) concludes by providing a qualified variant of the intuition that holds true 
irrespective of the real rigidity: any additional information at the hands of the firms 
necessarily reduces the welfare contribution of the optimal monetary policy if that 
comes without a change to the degree to which information is common (meaning 
an increase in the overall precision,  κ , without a change in the relative precision,  ϱ ).
We do not fully comprehend the non-monotonicities documented in part (ii). At 
this point, what we know for sure, thanks to parts (i) and (iii), is only that these 
non-monotonicities derive exclusively from the interaction of the real rigidity with 
the degree to which information is correlated across the firms.19 We thus reach the 
following summary.
THEOREM 4: Suppose that monetary policy is optimal.
(i) When the business cycle is driven by technology shocks, more information 
improves welfare by, and only by, improving the efficiency of the underlying flexi-
ble-price allocation.
(ii) When instead the business cycle is driven by markup shocks, more infor-
mation contributes to lower welfare both by exacerbating the inefficiency of the 
underlying flexible-price fluctuations and by reducing the ability of the monetary 
authority to combat these fluctuations. Nevertheless, when and only when the real 
rigidity is present, an ambiguous effect can obtain with changes in the composition 
of information.
This result refers to the solution of a Ramsey problem where the planner is 
free to select an arbitrary Gaussian process for the interest rate or, equivalently, 
to induce any triplet  ( λ s ,  λ z ,  σ m ) he wishes in condition (7). We now discuss what 
happens when the monetary policy falls short of this “unconstrained” optimum. 
This could be because the monetary authority has imperfect control of aggregate 
demand, because it observes the underlying shocks and/or the economic outcomes 
with noise, because its objectives diverge from the welfare criterion in the model, or 
because of any other reason that is left outside our model.
Not surprisingly, not much can be said if one puts no structure whatsoever on the 
deviation from optimality. To understand the logic, let us concentrate on the case 
of technology shocks. When the nominal rigidity is shut down, the informational 
friction represents a real distortion that moves the equilibrium away from the first 
best. Increasing the precision of the available information necessarily reduces the 
welfare cost of this distortion. When this is the only distortion, more information is 
unambiguously welfare-improving. But if an additional distortion is present due to 
the combination of nominal rigidity and suboptimal monetary policy, a second-best 
result applies: reducing information may increase welfare by having one distortion 
offset the other.
19 In part (iii), the ratio  ϱ is defined as the ratio of the precision of the private information to that of the public 
information. However, following Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and Bergemann and Morris (2013), this ratio can be 
interpreted more generally as a measure of the extent to which information is correlated across the agents.
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The opposite scenario, however, is also possible and seems relevant for the fol-
lowing reason. To the extent that she is guided by standard New-Keynesian les-
sons, the policymaker may fail to incorporate how the informational friction affects 
the nature of the optimal allocation and the corresponding policy targets. In so 
doing, the policymaker may inadvertently introduce distortions in addition to those 
induced by the informational friction. But when the latter vanishes, the policymak-
er’s “mistake” also vanishes. Under this scenario, more precise information may 
help increase welfare not only by attenuating the real rigidity but also by alleviating 
the policy suboptimality. We illustrate this logic in Section B3 of online Appendix 
B, with a numerical example that examines the welfare implications of policies that 
target either price-level or output-gap stabilization.
D. Monetary Shocks
Consider now   , the welfare term corresponding to deviations from the 
flexible-price benchmark that are orthogonal to the fundamental and the public sig-
nal. As already noted, these deviations can be interpreted as monetary shocks. So 
far, we have assumed that the firms have no information about them. But now sup-
pose the contrary. How does this distinct type of information matter for welfare?
This question is the subject matter of Hellwig (2005). The answer is as follows. 
Consider first the case of public information. In equilibrium, any commonly predict-
able variation in  m  t can have no real effect. Furthermore, any residual variation in  m t 
necessarily contributes to welfare losses, because  m  t is orthogonal to the underly-
ing preferences and technologies. It follows that more precise public information 
about  m t necessarily improves welfare (it reduces   ).
Consider next the case of private information. As with public information, pri-
vate information dampens the aggregate real effect of any given monetary shock. 
But unlike public information, private information does so in an imperfect manner, 
because the lack of common knowledge hinders the coordination of the firms’ pric-
ing decisions. At the same time, an increase in the precision of private information 
can exacerbate the cross-sectional misallocation of resources. It follows that more 
precise private information about monetary shocks can have a non-monotone wel-
fare effect. We refer the reader to Hellwig (2005) for a more detailed analysis of this 
particular effect.
E. Remarks
We conclude this section with four remarks regarding the possible endogeneity of 
the information structure and applicability of our results.
Remark 1: Although our analysis has treated the information structure of the 
firms as an exogenous object, this does not necessarily limit the usefulness of our 
results. Suppose, for example, that some of the available public information obtains 
from the release of macroeconomic indicators or from policy actions. Alternatively, 
suppose that the available private information is the product of costly information 
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acquisition, i.e., the informational friction is a symptom of inattention.20 Under 
these scenarios, the precisions  κ x and  κ z become endogenous to the behavior of the 
firms, as well as to that of the monetary authority. How this endogeneity shapes the 
mapping from “deeper” parameters to the precisions  κ x and  κ z , or how it impacts 
the nature of the optimal monetary policy, is beyond the scope of this paper. We 
refer the reader to Amador and Weill (2010); Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010); and 
Paciello and Wiederholt (2014) for certain explorations in this direction. But no 
matter how  κ x and  κ z are determined in the first place, the anatomy of the wel-
fare effects of information that our paper has offered remains valid in the following 
regard: the mapping from the precisions ( κ x ,  κ z  ) to equilibrium welfare is invariant 
to the micro-foundations of the former.
Remark 2: The reinterpretation of the informational friction in terms of limited 
attention also explains why the policymaker may be unable to eliminate the friction 
even if she happens to know the state and can reveal it to the firms before the latter 
make their production and pricing decision. But even if the informational friction 
cannot itself be eliminated, whether it ultimately has a bite on real allocations and 
welfare still hinges on whether the rigidity is real or nominal: when the rigidity is 
only nominal, a monetary policy that replicates flexible prices, and only this policy, 
guarantees that the friction ceases to have a bite on welfare. This underscores, once 
again, the distinct normative implications of the two rigidities and the pivotal role of 
monetary policy vis-à-vis the nominal one.
Remark 3: The two policy benchmarks we characterized in Theorems 3 and 4 
require that the policymaker observe the state of the economy. But as already men-
tioned, they do not presume that policymaker has an informational advantage over 
the firms at any time. It suffices that the policymaker commits to act in the future, 
after the state of the economy has become public information, provided of course 
that the market expects this to happen. This underscores the role of the policymaker 
in “managing expectations.”
Remark 4: Our analysis has orthogonalized the information structure in three 
dimensions: one corresponding to preference and technologies; one corresponding 
to monopoly markups and other real distortions; and one corresponding to pure 
monetary shocks. When translating our results to certain applied contexts, however, 
it may be natural to consider signals that confound two or more of these distinct 
types of information. For instance, to the extent that business cycles are driven by 
a mixture of technology, markup, and monetary shocks, macroeconomic statistics 
will serve as a mixed signal of all these shocks, and their combined welfare effect 
will itself be a mixture of the effects we have documented. A similar point applies 
20 One can contemplate various micro-foundations of how agents allocate attention. See, e.g., Pavan (2014) for a 
flexible approach. But as long as one maintains a Gaussian specification (which is the golden standard in the related 
literature), the results of Bergemann and Morris (2013) imply that the resulting equilibrium allocations can always 
be replicated with an information structure like the one we assume. 
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to central bank  communications insofar as they may contain only an overall assess-
ment of the state of the economy.
V. Related Literature
In this section we seek a certain synthesis of the related literature, revisiting the 
prior works of Hellwig (2005); Walsh (2007); Lorenzoni (2010); and Baeriswyl and 
Cornand (2010) under the lens of our analysis.
As already noted, these papers rule out real rigidity, a scenario nested in our 
framework by letting  θ = 0 . In this limit case, a monetary policy that replicates 
flexible prices implements the complete-information allocation. This is because the 
absence of real rigidity guarantees that the informational friction ceases to have a 
bite on real allocations and welfare once the “right” monetary policy is in place. 
Of course, such a policy may be unrealistic or undesirable. But the point we wish 
to make, for pedagogical reasons, is that the welfare effects reported in these prior 
works hinge entirely on deviations from the benchmark of replicating flexible prices: 
had monetary policy replicated flexible prices, the complete-information outcomes 
would have obtained.
Consider Hellwig (2005). Because that paper models  M t as an exogenous random 
walk and rules out shocks in preferences and technologies, all the volatility in  M t 
represents a monetary shock of the type described in Lemma 3. As noted in the 
previous section, the exercise conducted in Hellwig (2005) therefore boils down 
to studying the comparative statics of   with respect to the information that firms 
have about this shock, and the key unexpected finding is that private information 
has a non-monotone effect on relative-price dispersion and thereby on welfare as 
well. Clearly, these non-monotonicities reflect a discrepancy between the private 
and social value of coordination. But whereas the prior work appears to suggest that 
this discrepancy is innate to the Dixit-Stiglitz preference specification of modern 
macroeconomic models (see especially the discussion in Section 6.3 of Angeletos 
and Pavan 2007), our analysis clarifies that this discrepancy stems from the particu-
lar monetary policy assumed in Hellwig (2005).
Consider next Walsh (2007). That paper allows monetary policy to react sys-
tematically to shocks in preferences and markups (which Walsh interprets as, 
respectively, “demand shocks” and “cost-push shocks”). A deviation from the 
unconstrained optimum we studied in Section IV, however, obtains because of two 
types of policy frictions: the restriction that monetary policy can respond only to 
contemporaneous and noisy signals of the state of the economy, and the assump-
tion that policy objectives differ from the model’s ex ante utility. Unable to obtain 
analytic results, Walsh employs numerical simulations and arrives at a somewhat 
inconclusive answer to the question of interest, namely the welfare effects of central 
bank transparency. If instead one abstracts from the aforementioned policy frictions, 
a particularly sharp answer becomes available on the basis of our results: maximal 
transparency is  desirable in the face of benign forces such as technology shocks, 
and maximal opacity is desirable in the face of distortionary forces such as markup 
shocks.
Consider next Lorenzoni (2010). In that paper, there are no markup shocks, the 
policymaker observes perfectly the state of the economy (with a lag), and monetary 
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policy is set so as to maximize welfare. On the basis of our results, one may have 
expected monetary policy to replicate flexible prices and, in conjunction with the 
right noncontingent subsidy, to implement the first best. However, this is not the 
case because of the presence of an additional friction, a certain segmentation in 
consumer markets: each firm is matched with a random subset of consumers in the 
economy, and each consumer gets to see only a random subset of the prices in the 
economy. In the presence of this friction, a policy that implements the first-best 
response to the underlying aggregate shocks is still feasible, yet a distortion remains 
because prices cannot adjust to the idiosyncratic shocks induced by the random 
matching between the firms and the consumers. It is this distortion that drives the 
distinct welfare results reported in that paper.
Finally, consider Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010). Under the lens of our anal-
ysis, this paper makes two key assumptions. First, it requires that nominal GDP, 
 M t ≡  P t  Y t , satisfy
(13)  log  M t =  λ a ( a –t +  ϵ a, t ) +  λ μ (  μ – t +  ϵ μ, t ),  
where  a –t and  μ – t are the underlying technology and markup shocks,  ϵ a, t and  ϵ μ, t 
are exogenous noises, and  λ a and  λ μ are scalars under the control of the monetary 
authority. Second, it allows each firm to observe a noisy private signal of  log  M t . 
Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010) interpret  M t as the policy instrument, condition (13) 
as a policy rule, the noises  ( ϵ a, t ,  ϵ μ, t ) as measurement errors in the policymaker’s 
contemporaneous observation of the underlying shocks, and the firms’ signal of  M t 
as a signal of the policy action. The key contribution of that paper is then to study 
how the signaling role of monetary policy interacts with its stabilization role.
Our results qualify that paper’s analysis in the following regard. Interpreting (13) 
as the policy rule overlooks the ability of the monetary authority to control current 
outcomes by committing to move interest rates in the future. Such commitment 
would not only improve the stabilization role of monetary policy by utilizing addi-
tional information that may arrive in the future but would also mute the signaling 
effect of current policy actions. Ruling out this possibility is therefore a key unstated 
assumption, although perhaps a realistic one, behind the core result of that paper 
regarding the trade-off between the stabilization and the signaling roles of monetary 
policy.
Putting aside this point and the precise interpretation of condition (13), this con-
dition represents a restriction on the set of implementable allocations. This restric-
tion drives the optimal policy in that paper away from the unconstrained optimum 
we characterized in Section IV. This fact in turn is the key to understanding why 
welfare in that paper depends on the firms’ information about the technology shock 
despite the absence of real rigidity, as well as why welfare is a non-monotone func-
tion of the firms’ information about the markup shock, in contrast to the monotone 
effect we obtained in part (i) of Lemma 5. Finally, because condition (13) is nested 
in Lemma 3 of our paper by letting  m t =  λ a  ϵ a, t +  λ μ  ϵ μ, t  , the welfare effects of the 
signal that a firm receives about  M t can be understood under the lens of our analy-
sis as the mixture of three kinds of information: information about the technology 
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shock; information about the markup shock; and information about the policy “mis-
take” caused by measurement error.21
Let us close this section by noting the obvious: none of the preceding discussion 
is meant to downplay the contribution of the prior works. The mechanisms studied 
therein seem both intriguing and relevant. We nevertheless hope that our discussion 
has shed additional light on the inner workings of these mechanisms and on the 
assumptions that underlie them, thus also illustrating more generally how our paper 
can facilitate a useful anatomy of the welfare effects of information in baseline mac-
roeconomic models.
VI. Conclusion
By assuming away incomplete information and strategic uncertainty, standard 
macroeconomic models presume that firms can perfectly coordinate their produc-
tion and pricing decisions. By contrast, in this paper we allow an informational 
friction to inhibit this coordination and we study how this shapes the social value 
of information within an elementary business-cycle model. The key lessons can be 
summarized as follows:
•	 The	welfare	effects	of	information	can	be	decomposed	into	two	channels:	the	
real rigidity that emerges as firms make production choices on the basis of 
incomplete information and the nominal rigidity that emerges as firms also set 
prices on the basis of such information.
•	 The	 first	 channel	 is	 present	 irrespective	 of	 the	 conduct	 of	 monetary	 policy.	
It also has sharp comparative statics: more information is welfare-improving 
through this channel if the business cycle is driven by “benign” forces such 
as technology shocks and welfare-deteriorating if it is driven by distortionary 
forces such as markup shocks.
•	 By	contrast,	the	second	channel	hinges	on	the	conduct	of	monetary	policy.	As	
in the New-Keynesian framework, there is a policy that neutralizes the nominal 
rigidity. At the flexible-price benchmark, the welfare effects of information are 
shaped solely by the real-rigidity channel. Away from it, they hinge on whether 
the provision of more information dampens or amplifies the deviation of mon-
etary policy and on whether that deviation was desirable to begin with.
•	 When	 the	business	 cycle	 is	 driven	by	 technology	 shocks,	 a	monetary	policy	
that replicates flexible prices is optimal. When, instead, the business cycle is 
driven by markup shocks, a deviation from this benchmark is desirable. More 
information then tends to decrease welfare not only because it exacerbates the 
inefficiency of the underlying flexible-price fluctuations but also because it cur-
tails the monetary authority’s ability to combat these fluctuations.
We view the sharpness of these lessons and their close connection to familiar 
normative properties of RBC and New-Keynesian models as the main strengths 
of our contribution. This sharpness, however, comes at a cost. By narrowing the 
21 The welfare effects of the first two types of information are those mentioned above. The third one has a 
non-monotone effect for the reason first explained in Hellwig (2005). 
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analysis within the context of an elementary model, we preclude any quantitative 
assessment. By treating the information structure as exogenous, we bypass the ques-
tion of either how information gets collected or what policy instruments can affect 
it. Finally, while we allow the informational friction to inhibit the coordination of 
production and pricing decisions of firms, we assume away any such friction in, 
say, the  consumption and saving choices of households or the trades of financial 
investors. The bite of incomplete information on the social efficiency of the latter 
kind of  economic decisions, and the implications of this for the business cycle, is an 
important open research question.
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